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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RODNEY L.

PHILLIPS~

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18,211

JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; JAMES C.
McGARRY, JR.; LINDA McGARRY;
JAMES R. GLAVAS, d/b/a J. G.
REALTY; JAMES GLEASON; ROBERT
G. Al\JDRRSON; UNITED FARM
AGENCY INC., a Utah corporation; CLAN STILSON; and
DOES I through XV,
1

Defendants-Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL

POINT I
THERE -WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
AT TRIAL TO BASE A VERDICT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT, UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., A
UTAH CORPORATION.
.
Plaintiff assumes, without any substantiation, that in
the instant transaction, Robert Anderson was United Farm
Agency's agent and that United Farm Agency was· Robert
Anderson's principal.

Plaintiff then proceeds to quote

general principal-agent law, but in the context of the
instant facts plaintiff fails. to establish, based_upon the
record, either that United Farm Agency was actually Robert
Anderson's principal or that an agency relationship of any type
even existed.

It is appellant's position that.the plaintiff must

demonstrate facts which would establish the legal relationship
between Anderson and United Farm Agency.

The facts in this case
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are simply inadequate to establish an independent contractor
relationship let alone an employment relationship between
Anderson and United Farm.

Appellant set out in detail the

elements that must be established to prove an employment relationship (Appellant's Brief pp. 13-17), and the respondent simply
has failed to refute the fact that there is no evidence in therecord to support the finding of employment and the imputation
of liability from A.i.""1der.son to United Farm.

Without alluding

to the record, plaintiff reaches the unwarranted and unfounded
conclusion that United Farm Agency is plaintiff's agent.

Plaintiff

reached this conclusion despite the fact that it's deal with
Anderson was not

consUITu.~ated

.

with United Farm Agency forms, was

not closed w.ith Hr. Snow, United Farm Agency's attorney, was in
contravention of United Farm Agency policies and Utah statutes,
· and was done without the knowledge of United Farm Agency's broker
or United Fann Agency.
-Plaintiff knew at the time the Earnest Money Agreement
in this action was signed, that it was not a United Farm
Agency document.

Neither United Farm Agency nor it's broker,

Clan Stilson, were aware of nor involved with the closing.
Plaintiff is attempting to establish that United Farm Agency ·-·
was Anderson's principal in spite of the fact that the
entire transaction that occurred on August 14, 1978, was in
violation of United Farm Agency policies and practices as
established and was for Anderson's sole benefit and interest.
Defendant's Brief on Appeal makes it clear that United
Farm Agency was not Robert Anderson's prlncipal with respect
to the transaction in issue.

Plaintiff, in his Brief of
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Respondent, has sho-vm nothing which would refute this fact.
Plaintiff has alleged negligence on the part of United
Farm Agency for its failure to supervise the activities and
conduct of Anderson.

The allegation stems from a section of

United Farm Agencv's brief which plaintiff extracted and
used completely out of context.

(Brief on Appeal at 16).

The statement by defendant :Ln his brief referred only to the
instant transaction.

The reason that no supervision existed

was that United Farm Agency was unaware of Anderson's activities.
Plaintiff relies on Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
590 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1979), to establish the fact that
UFA knew or should have kno'i-m that Anderson was mishandling

plaintiff's affairs.

However, the language from

~ells

which plaintiff in the instant case relies.is not the

upon
langu~ge

· · of the Court, but rather, language from the complaint in Wells.
A careful reading of Wells will reveal that the Court is not
endorsing the notion, as plaintiff in the instant action has
s·upposed, that a principal always knows or should know all
activities and conduct of its agent.

Rather, the Court is saying

that if that were true in that specific case, .it would establish a basis for granting relief.

Wells provide no authority,

for the instant plaintiff's conclusion that, as a matter of law,
United Farm Agency knew or should have known of Anderson's
activities and conduct.
Assuming, arguendo, that a principal-agent relationship
existed in the instant case, the holding in Wells would dictate
that United Farm Agency is not liable for the acts of Anderson.
In discussing the liability.of a principal for the acts of an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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agent or employee when those acts are committed without the
principal's authority or knowledge, the Court in Wells held;
It is, of course, to be recognized that if
the employee is not so authorized and is
acting for his own interest, and not in the
furtherance of the employer's business, the
'latter would not be bound by his acts.

590 P.2d at 1264.
In the instant case, it is clear that Anderson was not
acting with the authority and knowledge of United Farm Agency.
The alleged uclosingu was in contravention of United Farm Agency
_policies, no ·attorney was used, the documents used were not
United Farm Agency's, United Farm did not receive a commission
and·no person from United Farm Agency ever -knew of or approved
of. the. "deal .. "

Therefore, on the authority of Wells., United Farm

Agency would not be bound by or liable for the acts of Anderson •
.It is respectfully submitted· that the decision imputing
the conduct of Anderson to Clan Stilson and United Farm
Agency, a Utah corporation, is without support in the record
an...d should be reversed.

The relationship between real

estate salesman and broker is established by statute.
Contravention of this statute as well as the established
policies of the broker by the salesman should prevent any
vicarious liability from arising with respect to such faulty
transactions.

POINT II
AN INDIVIDUAL CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION IN HIS
OR HER NAME FOR WRONGS DONE BY THIRD PARTIES
TO A CORPORATION WITH WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL
IS ASSOCIATED.
In respondent's brief, plaintiff seems to be laboring
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under the misconception t·hat the plaintiff and Phillip's
Construction Companv, Inc., are the same entity.

While

plaintiff ·admits that a corporation, Phillip's Construction
Company, Inc., was formed in 1978, he states in his brief
that "the plaintiff did business personally as .Phillip's
Construction Company at all times."

It is a contradiction

i_n terms to say that nplaintiff did business personally at
all times" while admitting that "business was intended to be
carried on through the corporation."

The only testimony in

the record that relates to how the plaintiff conducted his business is that elicited from the plaintiff, Rodney Phillips.
Phillips testified that after the formation of the corporation, all of the business and business assets were owned by the
corporation, with the exception of th_e equipment which allegedly
~.,,

was retained by Mr. Phillis (Tr. 132).
It is crucial in this action that any damages suffered
by plaintiff and any damages suffered by Phillip's Construction

Company, Inc., be properly separated and recognized as
distinct.

Plaintiff was given, at the time of·the transaction,

promissory notes totaling $79,000.00 which represented his
equity in the business.

However, the accounts receivable

·and accounts payable in issue are matters which touch and
concern the corporation, Phillip's.Cohstruction Company,
Inc.

Plaintiff admitted at trial that he was n·ever paid any

of the obligations for which he is allegedly responsible on
the corporation's behalf.
d~mages

He has, therefore, sustained no

with respect to such obligations.

As discussed in

defendant's Brief on Appeal, the Court in Norman v. Murray
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First Thrift & Loan Co. , 596 P. 2d 1023 (Utah 1979), ·emphasized
. the.emnity that should exist between a shareholder and a
corporation, such as plaintiff and Phillip's Construction
Company, Inc., in the instant case.

The Court in Norman

held:
[F]or· even though .a shareholder owns
all, or practicallv all, of the stock
in a corporation such a fact does not
authorize him to sue as an individual
for a wrong done by a third party to
the corporation.

f

Plaintiff's damages, if any, should properly be limited
to any losses which he mav have personally incurred . . It is,
therefore, irrelevant with respect to plaintiff's plea for
damages that he sees himself as obligated in some manner for
debts which he has n_ever paid, and which are properly the
debts of Phillip's Construction Company, Inc.

The facts clearly

show that the plaintiff did not prove that the corporation had
been

purs~ed

or that any of the creditors had looked to him for

payment •. Finally, Phillis has filed_bankruptcy and accordingly
he cannot make a claim for debts he will never be obligated
to pay.

POINT III
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH REFERS
TO THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO ASSUME
CORPORATE LIABILITIES OF PHILLIP'S CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IS VOID AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Plaintiff has alleged in his brief that the defense of
the Statute of Frauds is unavailable to United Farm Agency
with respect to plaintiff's obligations which JCM Development
·.Company was allegedly to have assumed and paid.

Nowhere in
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plaintiff's bri~f has he alleged that a signed agreement existed
pursuan~

to which any one of the defendants would assume the

obligations and debts of the plaintiff.

Even the moderate

amount of debt set out ih the Earnest Money Agreement was extinguished by the subsequent negotiation and execution of the
warranty deed as explained in United Farm Agency's Brief on
· Appeal.

(Brief on Appeal at 30-31).

The absence of such an

agreement, signed by the party to be charged, definitely
brings the matter under the statute of frauds.
Plaintiff alleges t_hat the statute of frauds is unavailable
to the defendant because it was not affirmatively pled.
United Farm Agency did not _affirmatively plead the Statute of
Frauds defense because plaintiff's obligations were not specifically
delineC?-_ted as part of plaintiff's damages.

Furthermore, it·

"',..'

was completely unclear whether the obligations were plaintiff's
personal obligations, obligations of Phillip's Construction
Company, Inc., etc.

As pointed out in United Farm Agency's

brief, plaintiff has waived his right to recover for the debts
and obligations because they were not specifically stated as
special damages.

(Brief on Appeal at 32).

It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff has
waived his right to claim the debts as damages or, in the
alternative, any duty the defendants had to make an affirmative
defense is obviated by the plaintiff's failure to specify
the items of special damage which he contended he was entitled
to recover.
POINT IV
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.THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT ANDERSON
FOR BREACH OF DUTIES OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff has made several allegations in his brief
that are.not in line with the facts.

Plaintiff states that

on August 14, 1978, Robert Anderson expressed no concern at
the manner of the closing when he knew things were not being
done as they should.

In fact, Anderson testified that he

did not know that the meeting o.f August 14, 1978, was a
"closing. n

Furthermore, plaintiff had .reserved in the

listing agreement the right to sell the property himself and
had in fact dealt directly with the other parties at times
without Anderson.

Because of the nature of the listing

agreement, Anderson could not force himself upon plaintiff.·
and require that he, Anderson, be the one to sell the
prop~rty

and handle the deal.

And.erson advised plaintiff as

to the impropriety of executing the deal as a stock transfer,
but regardless of that advice, plaintiff chose to proceed as
requested by the other parties.
The trial court found that Anderson had a responsibility.
to see that the closing was handled by an attorney.
plaintiff dealt directly with Gleason who handled the
in a manner contrary to the
There~ore,

~dvice

However,
closing-~

Anderson had given plaintiff.

Anderson should have no obli.gation to provide an

attorney for a closing he was not handling and for a seller
who he was no longer representing and who was. selling against
his advice.
Plaintiff has suggested that Anderson was aware or knew
of JCM Development's financial incapacity.

This is out of
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line with the facts.

Anderson was contemplating .making a

sale of land to JCM.

He would not have done so if he had

By making such

the information plaintiff alleges he had.

suggestions, it would seem that plaintiff is attempting to
exculpate his o-vm unwise decision to

accep~

unsecured notes

from parties with whom he had. dealt directly and of whom he
knew nothing.

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability upon
Anderson and that the. legal test used by the Court in
defining the standard of care to be imposed upon i\nderson. is
improper.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of September, 1982.

~.. ~~
PE~RSE-;-

RCHARD. *ofFSON or :
HOWARD, LEWIS &
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent United Farm Agency
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Reply Brief on
Appeal to Mr. Paul
P.O. Box 339, Moab,

w.

Mortensen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
Utah

84532-0339; dated this

d 3_

day of

September, 1982.
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